The objective of this article is to analyze the effects that the BEPS plan has had on our national legal system. To do so, we will first provide a general explanation of what it entails. In 2013, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), together with the countries that make up the G20 (including Mexico), began developing a plan to combat Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (hereinafter, the BEPS plan, as per its acronym in English). The goal of the BEPS plan is to ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities are carried out and, consequently, where wealth is generated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The BEPS plan consists of fifteen actions grouped into three fundamental pillars:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is important to note that certain provisions of the Income Tax Law (ISR) and the BEPS plan are closely correlated with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. These guidelines were approved by the OECD Council and are applicable under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 179 of the Income Tax Law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While the BEPS plan is still in the implementation phase, some of its effects have been immediate. Its application was soon discussed by judicial bodies of the Federal Judiciary and the Federal Court of Administrative Justice, following legal challenges filed by various taxpayers. Consequently, certain measures of the plan, such as intangibles (Action 8) and related-party information reporting (Action 13), which form an integral part of the 15 BEPS actions, have been debated by judicial bodies in our country. The interpretations derived from these rulings are of significant importance, particularly given their impact on transfer pricing matters. In this regard, we present the scope of these rulings in relation to the BEPS plan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Action 8 of the BEPS plan (Intangibles) aims to prevent multinational companies from eroding the tax base through intangible assets. The most recent version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines proposes a new definition for these types of assets: something that is neither a physical nor a financial asset, that can be owned or controlled for use in business activities, and whose use or transfer would generate compensation if the transaction were conducted between independent parties under comparable circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition to this already restrictive definition, the OECD proposes distinguishing between the “economic ownership” and “legal ownership” of an intangible. This distinction is crucial, as an entity\u2014whether an individual or a legal entity\u2014that carries out certain activities referred to in transfer pricing terminology as “DEMPE” (Development, Enhancement, Maintenance, Protection, and Exploitation) may be entitled to claim an arm’s length remuneration for performing such activities. Alternatively, it could claim the economic ownership of the intangible, which, for tax purposes, would mean rejecting any royalty payments as compensation for licensing the intangible to which it has economically contributed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this regard, the Superior Chamber of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice has established interpretative criteria related to intangibles. In resolving an attraction case, the court analyzed an issue closely related to BEPS Action 8. Given its importance and implications, we consider it necessary to provide a procedural summary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Following an audit by the International Tax Administration, a legal entity (hereinafter referred to as “the taxpayer” or “the plaintiff”) whose primary business activity is the purchase, sale, distribution, and trade of alcoholic beverages, was found to have made improper deductions in the audited fiscal year. These deductions were related to “marketing expenses” and “advertising and promotional expenses” under a non-exclusive trademark licensing agreement. The tax authority determined that these expenses did not meet the requirement of being “strictly necessary” as established in the Income Tax Law (ISR).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The taxpayer had entered into a non-exclusive trademark licensing agreement with a related party. However, following a corporate restructuring, the related party relocated its tax domicile to Switzerland, obtaining legal ownership of intangible assets developed in Mexico, including the licensed trademark. Consequently, the related party, now based in Switzerland, became the beneficiary of contracts granting the use and exploitation of intangible assets to its Mexican affiliates, which acted as product distributors. The tax authority argued that the corporate group effectively shifted profits to Switzerland by licensing its intangibles, creating a deductible expense in Mexico while ensuring that the related profits were taxed in Switzerland\u2014a jurisdiction with lower tax rates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To challenge this determination and demonstrate that, contrary to the tax authority’s claim, the expenses were indeed strictly necessary for its business purposes (and thus deductible for ISR purposes), the taxpayer filed an administrative appeal. This appeal was denied by the Central Administration of Tax Litigation for Large Taxpayers within the Tax Administration Service (SAT). The taxpayer subsequently filed an administrative lawsuit, which was reviewed by the Second Section of the Superior Chamber of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice under its power of attraction. We will now analyze the legal arguments presented by the taxpayer, the tax authority’s response, and the court\u2019s ruling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Second Section of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice analyzed the ISR law to interpret the term “strictly necessary.” Based on Federal Judiciary precedents, the court established three conditions for an expense to be deemed indispensable:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Based on this framework, the court evaluated the taxpayer\u2019s corporate purpose and business operations to determine whether the disputed expenses met these criteria. The court\u2019s conclusions will be analyzed in the following section.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
FIRST. Regarding the first ground for challenge raised by the plaintiff and the response to it by the defendant authority, the Second Section determined that only the trademark owner could incur advertising and publicity expenses, as these expenses increase the brand’s value as sales margins grow. Consequently, the trademark owner directly benefits from such expenditures since it is in their interest to promote and maintain their brand’s value or, ideally, to increase it. Therefore, the responsibility for financing promotional activities lies with the trademark owner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Thus, if the plaintiff incurred advertising expenses for a licensed trademark under the corresponding agreement, claiming that such expenses were made to position its product in the market, such disbursements are inadmissible as deductions. This is not only because the plaintiff is not the trademark owner but also because the expenses fail to meet the strict necessity requirements for the licensor’s purposes, as they are neither directly related to its business activity nor essential for its development. Moreover, the advertising expenses undertaken by the trademark owner inherently include the positioning of the plaintiff’s product through the use and\/or exploitation of the intangible asset granted via the licensing agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
SECOND. When resolving the second ground for challenge, it was determined that marketing expenses\u2014understood as expenditures that facilitate the placement of the product in suitable sales locations and provide it with distribution conditions\u2014may be considered deductible for income tax (ISR) purposes. This is because, according to the incorporation deed, the taxpayer’s corporate purpose includes the purchase, sale, distribution, and trade of alcoholic beverages. Consequently, these expenses meet the strict necessity requirement, as they enable the commercialization of the taxpayer’s product by providing distribution conditions and channels. Without such expenditures, the company’s operations and normal business development would be hindered. The expenses generate a benefit by increasing product sales, thus meeting the strict necessity requirements. Therefore, the tax authority’s assertion that marketing expenses were covered under the trademark licensing agreement was inappropriate, as the analysis of the contract and its amendment did not stipulate any provisions regarding marketing expenses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As seen in the previous example, while the Federal Court of Administrative Justice (TFJA) did not explicitly reference the BEPS plan in its interpretation and analysis, its reasoning aligns with Action 8 (intangibles) of the plan. Specifically, the taxpayer engaged in DEMPE functions, which are exclusive to the economic rights holder of the intangible asset. Consequently, as a mere licensee, the taxpayer lacked the legal or economic right to incur advertising expenses for the brand. As outlined above, the licensee could not claim deductions for advertising expenditures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
ACTION 13 OF THE BEPS PLAN AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 76-A OF THE INCOME TAX LAW (ISR LAW).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Action 13 of the BEPS plan (country-by-country reporting and transfer pricing documentation) establishes a requirement for multinational enterprises to provide comprehensive documentation of their intercompany transactions. Such documentation must include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This action aims to enhance transparency among tax administrations and provides recommendations and frameworks related to transfer pricing determinations for related-party transactions. The OECD states that Action 13 enables tax authorities to conduct assessments and risk evaluations in transfer pricing matters, playing a crucial role in addressing base erosion and profit shifting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this context, on November 18, 2015, a Decree was published amending, supplementing, and repealing various tax provisions. Of particular relevance is the addition of Article 76-A to the ISR Law, which establishes the obligation for taxpayers engaged in related-party transactions to submit the informational declarations specified in that article. Additionally, the amendments and reforms to Articles 32-D, Section IV, 81, Section XL, and 82, Section XXXVII, of the Federal Tax Code stipulate that failure to submit these declarations results in a series of cascading penalties. These include fines ranging from $154,800.00 to $220,400.00 and restrictions on entering into contracts with the federal government, centralized and decentralized public administration entities, and the Attorney General’s Office. These measures ensure compliance with Action 13 of the BEPS plan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) established interpretative criteria regarding these legal provisions in response to indirect amparo appeals (781\/2016 and others). The Court ruled on the constitutionality of requiring taxpayers to submit informational declarations. While Mexico’s highest court upheld the lower court rulings in reviewing these appeals, it is crucial to examine the grounds for challenge and the Court’s stance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
FIRST.<\/strong> The plaintiffs argued that Article 76-A of the ISR Law violates the right to legal certainty, as it “obliges taxpayers to provide information that they may lack the legal or practical ability to obtain from their related parties.” They contended that the parent company does not necessarily control or influence its subsidiaries to require and obtain such information, making the legislative measure disproportionate. Regarding the principle of legality, they argued that the obligation constitutes a “burdensome administrative act” that should comply with Article 16 of the Constitution. They claimed that the obligation enables tax authorities to exercise verification powers without taxpayers’ knowledge until the pre-liquidation stage, leaving them in a state of uncertainty and subjecting them to continuous fiscal scrutiny. Additionally, they asserted that the enabling clause in the final paragraph of Article 76-A violates the principle of legal reservation by allowing the SAT to regulate matters reserved for Congress or exceed its legally established powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n SECOND.<\/strong> They argued that the law violates the principle of territoriality by “imposing obligations that affect or relate to jurisdictions beyond the Mexican state,” requiring taxpayers to provide information about foreign-related parties. They contended that proper international agreements should be created for tax authorities to obtain information from foreign third parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n THIRD.<\/strong> The plaintiffs alleged a violation of the right to privacy and data protection, asserting that the tax authority could misuse the informational declarations at any time and potentially disclose them to foreign authorities, thereby challenging the constitutionality of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Country-by-Country Reporting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n FOURTH.<\/strong> They claimed that the law violates the fundamental right to the inviolability of domicile, arguing that information provided electronically constitutes an “extension of domicile” that tax authorities obtain without complying with Article 16 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n FIFTH.<\/strong> They invoked the presumption of innocence in relation to administrative sanctions, arguing that tax authorities demand documentation without following proper procedures for administrative penalties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n SIXTH.<\/strong> They contended that the legal consequences of failing to submit informational declarations result in excessive and disproportionate penalties, violating the constitutional principles of individualization and proportionality of punishment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Supreme Court analyzed each ground for challenge and determined that the obligations under Article 76-A are formal in nature and do not impose undue burdens on taxpayers. The ruling emphasized the need for international tax cooperation and transparency. Moreover, the Court upheld the constitutionality of informational declarations, rejecting claims of privacy violations, territorial overreach, and excessive penalties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In conclusion, the SCJN validated the informational reporting requirements under Action 13 of the BEPS plan, reinforcing the legal framework for combating tax avoidance and ensuring corporate tax transparency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]<\/a> Proyecto OCDE\/G20 de Erosi\u00f3n de la Base Imponible y Traslado de Beneficios. (2014). Orientaciones relativas a la Documentaci\u00f3n sobre Precios de Transferencia y el Informe Pa\u00eds por Pa\u00eds<\/em>. Acci\u00f3n 13: Objetivo del 2014, p. 9. Disponible en: <\/em>https:\/\/www.oecd.org\/ctp\/Action-13-ESP-preliminary-version.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a> OCDE. (2015). Proyecto OCDE\/G20 sobre la Erosi\u00f3n de la Base Imponible y el Traslado de Beneficios. <\/em>Informes Finales 2015, p. 9-10. Disponible en:<\/em> https:\/\/www.oecd.org\/ctp\/beps-resumen-informativo.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a> Hallivis, Manuel. \u00bfQu\u00e9 es el BEPS? <\/em>enIDC Ediciones Especiales. Mayo 2018, p. 3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a> OECD. Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. A.6.6., p. 252. 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [5]<\/a> El asunto deriva del Juicio de Atracci\u00f3n 15378\/16-17-09-2\/1484\/18-S2-08-04. Disponible en versi\u00f3n p\u00fablica en: <\/em>http:\/\/sentencias.tfjfa.gob.mx:8080\/SICSEJLDOC\/faces\/content\/public\/consultasentencia.xhtml <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/a> Para mayor informaci\u00f3n consultar RTFJA, 8\u00aa \u00c9poca, N\u00famero 36, Julio 2019, pp. 287-296.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/a> RTFJA, 8\u00aa \u00c9poca, N\u00famero 36, Julio 2019, p. 285. Tesis al rubro: GASTOS DE PROPAGANDA Y PUBLICIDAD. SU DEDUCCI\u00d3N ES IMPROCEDENTE, AL NO SER ESTRICTAMENTE INDISPENSABLES PARA LA EMPRESA QUE VENDE PRODUCTOS BAJO MARCAS CUYO USO Y EXPLOTACI\u00d3N LE FUERON OTORGADOS MEDIANTE UN CONTRATO DE LICENCIA NO EXCLUSIVA.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/a> RTFJA, 8\u00aa \u00c9poca, N\u00famero 36, Julio 2019, p. 284. Tesis al rubro: GASTOS DE COMERCIALIZACI\u00d3N. SON DEDUCIBLES PARA EFECTOS DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, AL SER ESTRICTAMENTE INDISPENSABLES PARA LA EMPRESA QUE VENDE PRODUCTOS BAJO MARCAS CUYO USO Y EXPLOTACI\u00d3N LE FUERON OTORGADOS MEDIANTE UN CONTRATO DE LICENCIA NO EXCLUSIVA.<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/a> Rojas, Aldrin. Reporte pa\u00eds a pa\u00eds y documentaci\u00f3n de precios de transferencia. <\/em>enIDC Ediciones Especiales. Mayo 2018, p. 53.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [10]<\/a> Proyecto OCDE\/G20, op. cit<\/em>, p. 13.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [11]<\/a> Vigente a partir del 2016, se exhorta al lector consultar el art\u00edculo 76-A de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [12]<\/a> Cifras actualizables, consultar la fracci\u00f3n XXXVII del art\u00edculo 82 del C\u00f3digo Fiscal de la Federaci\u00f3n.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [13]<\/a> La presente s\u00edntesis deriva de los amparos indirectos en revisi\u00f3n 781\/2016, 782\/2016, 927\/2016, 954\/2016, 1000\/2016 y 1006\/2016, resueltos por la Segunda Sala de la SCJN. Disponibles en versi\u00f3n p\u00fablica en: <\/em>http:\/\/www2.scjn.gob.mx\/ConsultaTematica\/PaginasPub\/TematicaPub.aspx<\/p>\n\n\n\n [14]<\/a> Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country by Country Reports, <\/em>en su locuci\u00f3n en ingl\u00e9s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [15]<\/a> Multa y prohibici\u00f3n para contratar con la administraci\u00f3n p\u00fablica.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [16]<\/a> Tesis de Jurisprudencia, 2a.\/J.49\/2017 (10a.) SJF, D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina. 585. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. EL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016, POR S\u00cd MISMO NO DA LUGAR A UN ACTUAR ARBITRARIO DE LA AUTORIDAD HACENDARIA.<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [17]<\/a> Tesis de Jurisprudencia, 2a.\/J.47\/2017 (10a.) SJF. D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina 582. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. EL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE AL RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016, NO VIOLA EL DERECHO A LA SEGURIDAD JUR\u00cdDICA.<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [18]<\/a> Consideraciones plasmadas por la Segunda Sala de la SCJN, en la ejecutoria del amparo directo en revisi\u00f3n 782\/2016, del cual deriva la Tesis de Jurisprudencia, 2a.\/J.48\/2017 (10a.) SJF. <\/em>D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina 586. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. EL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016, PREV\u00c9 UNA OBLIGACI\u00d3N DE NATURALEZA FORMAL, QUE NO CONSTITUYE UN ACTO DE MOLESTIA NI ENTRA\u00d1A EL EJERCICIO DE FACULTADES DE COMPROBACI\u00d3N.<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [19]<\/a> Tesis de Jurisprudencia 2a.\/J.50\/2017 (10a.) SJF. D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina 588. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. EL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A, \u00daLTIMO P\u00c1RRAFO (PRIMERA PARTE), DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016, AL PREVER UNA CL\u00c1USULA HABILITANTE NO VIOLA LOS PRINCIPIOS DE LEGALIDAD Y SEGURIDAD JUR\u00cdDICA.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [20]<\/a> Consideraciones plasmadas por la Segunda Sala de la SCJN, en la ejecutoria derivada del amparo directo en revisi\u00f3n 1936\/2005, de la cual deriva la Tesis Aislada, 2a.VII\/2007, SJF, <\/em>Novena \u00c9poca, Tomo XXV, marzo de 2007, p\u00e1gina 711. TERRITORIALIDAD DE LAS LEYES FISCALES. SU FUNDAMENTO DERIVA DEL PRINCIPIO DE LEGALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [21]<\/a> Ibidem.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [22]<\/a> Consideraciones plasmadas Segunda Sala de la SCJN; en la ejecutoria del amparo indirecto en revisi\u00f3n 1000\/2016, del cual deriva la Tesis Aislada, 2a.LXVII\/2017 (10a.), SJF<\/em>, D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Tomo I, mayo de 2017, p\u00e1gina 722. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. EL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016, NO VIOLA EL PRINCIPIO DE TERRITORIALIDAD DE LAS LEYES.<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [23]<\/a> Como en los casos en que mediante tratado internacional en vigor del que M\u00e9xico sea parte, que contenga disposiciones de intercambio rec\u00edproco de informaci\u00f3n, se podr\u00e1 suministrar la informaci\u00f3n a las autoridades fiscales extranjeras y dicha informaci\u00f3n \u00fanicamente podr\u00e1 utilizarse para fines distintos a los fiscales cuando as\u00ed lo establezca el propio tratado y las autoridades fiscales lo autoricen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [24]<\/a> Tesis de Jurisprudencia, 2a.\/J.51\/2017 (10a). SJF. D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina 592. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. LAS AUTORIDADES FISCALES Y SU PERSONAL DEBEN MANTENER EN RESGUARDO Y CONFIDENCIALIDAD LA INFORMACI\u00d3N PROPORCIONADA EN T\u00c9RMINOS DEL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [25]<\/a> Tesis Aislada, 2a. LXIV\/2017 (10a.) SJF. D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina 723. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. EL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016, NO VIOLA LOS PRINCIPIOS DE RAZONABILIDAD Y PROPORCIONALIDAD JUR\u00cdDICA.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [26]<\/a> Cabe decir que el mencionado Acuerdo Multilateral forma parte de una de las tres v\u00edas para facilitar el intercambio de los reportes pa\u00eds a pa\u00eds, el cual fue firmado por M\u00e9xico el 27 de enero de 2016, junto con otras 68 jurisdicciones. Consultar en: Rojas, Aldrin. Reporte pa\u00eds a pa\u00eds (\u2026), op. cit., <\/em>p. 55.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [27]<\/a> Tesis Aislada, 2a. LXIII\/2017 (10a.). SJF. D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina 725. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. ES IMPROCEDENTE EL JUICIO DE AMPARO INDIRECTO CONTRA EL ACUERDO MULTILATERAL ENTRE AUTORIDADES COMPETENTES SOBRE EL INTERCAMBIO DE REPORTES PA\u00cdS POR PA\u00cdS, EN TANTO NO CONTIENE SUPUESTOS NORMATIVOS APLICABLES DIRECTAMENTE A LOS CONTRIBUYENTES.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [28]<\/a> Tesis de Jurisprudencia, 2a.\/J.46\/2017 (10a.). SJF. D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina 590. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. LA OBLIGACI\u00d3N PREVISTA EN EL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016, ATIENDE A LOS COMPROMISOS INTERNACIONALES ASUMIDOS POR EL ESTADO MEXICANO.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [29]<\/a> Tesis Aislada, 2a.LXV\/2017 (10a.) SJF. D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina 721. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. EL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016, NO TRANSGREDE EL DERECHO A LA<\/strong> INVIOLABILIDAD DEL DOMICILIO.<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [30]<\/a> Tesis Aislada, 2a.LXVI\/2017 (10a.) SJF. D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina 720. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. A LA OBLIGACI\u00d3N PREVISTA EN EL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016, <\/strong>NO LE SON APLICABLES LAS REGLAS Y PRINCIPIOS DEL DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO SANCIONADOR.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n [31]<\/a> Tesis Aislada, 2a.LXII\/2017 (10a.) SJF. D\u00e9cima \u00c9poca, Libro 42, mayo de 2017, Tomo I, p\u00e1gina 726. DECLARACIONES INFORMATIVAS DE PARTES RELACIONADAS. ES IMPROCEDENTE EL JUICIO DE AMPARO INDIRECTO CONTRA LAS DISPOSICIONES QUE PREV\u00c9N CONSECUENCIAS JUR\u00cdDICAS POR EL INCUMPLIMIENTO DE LA OBLIGACI\u00d3N DE PRESENTARLAS, EN TANTO NO INTEGRAN UN SISTEMA NORMATIVO CON EL ART\u00cdCULO 76-A DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA, VIGENTE A PARTIR DEL 1 DE ENERO DE 2016.<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nINTERPRETATIONS ISSUED BY THE SCJN.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n